

From the Editor

In this issue, Lieutenant General Mike Steele completes his two-part report on the proceedings of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel. The first part appeared in the July-August 2001 issue of *Military Review*. In this article, Lieutenant General Steele discusses the panel's recommendations.

Congressman Ike Skelton argues that the past holds lessons for contemporary soldiers in asymmetric warfare. In recalling the Indian campaigns of yesteryear, he advises, "we must not fall into the same trap of underestimating a potential adversary because of his different culture or seemingly inferior capability. To do so would be to repeat errors of the past with potentially devastating future consequences."

Leadership and training remain vital issues to the Army. Gillespie, the 2001 MacArthur Award winner, proposes that the Army's leadership doctrine should be nested horizontally and vertically to provide a more comprehensive body of doctrine than is currently available. Hertling and Boisselle review the National Training Center's 20 years of excellent service and preview its 21st-century innovations.

Commanders continue to be challenged to conduct peace operations ever more effectively. The authors in this section discuss how commanders might achieve this. Thomas introduces us to "policekeeping" and the effect of information technology on peacekeeping operations. Anderson proposes that operational commanders can enhance their chances for successful peacekeeping by developing measures of effectiveness to determine success. Siegel offers insight into intelligence challenges posed by civil-military operations that might not exist in traditional warfighting operations. Bingham, Cleary and Rubini share their experiences as part of a civil affairs ministerial advisory team in Haiti.

Because peace operations can erode fundamental warfighting skills, senior leaders must keep essential functions—core competencies—honed and ready. Logistics is a particularly important core competency. The solution, according to Ferris and Keithly, is outsourcing—contracting commercial logisticians to perform noncore logistics functions.

Is technology the answer to battlefield confusion? Kiesling argues that for Clausewitz, the real confusion of battle is not the so-called fog of war created by imperfect or incomplete information but the friction generated in the commander's mind by uncertainty, exhaustion and fear. Kipp and Grau argue that the very technology that commanders increasingly rely on to clear the fog of war creates its own fog and friction.

As the 43d Editor in Chief of *Military Review*, I will continue the journal's tradition of stimulating discussion to address the challenges that the US Armed Forces face. There are no perfect solutions—only workable ones. This journal plays a vital part in developing these solutions.

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